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DEALING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE UNDER THE
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR.*
ABSTRACT
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) was an important
environmental law for several decades before climate change became an
issue of concern. In the 1990s, efforts began to include in NEPA’s envi-
ronmental assessments and environmental impact statements both the
impact of federal government actions on climate change and the impact of
climate change on proposed federal actions. These efforts were encouraged
by the Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”). However, implemen-
tation at the agency level has since been uneven. Some federal agencies
have resisted making serious efforts to incorporate climate change impacts
into their decision-making process. Moreover, the courts have not been
consistent in their reviews of agency compliance with NEPA, and the ju-
diciary often gives substantial deference to an agency’s minimal NEPA
compliance. Since 2017, determining NEPA’s requirements for climate
change analysis has become more challenging because the Trump admin-
istration is changing federal environmental policies and regulations in
order to encourage fossil fuel energy development and use, which will in-
crease the emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHG”).
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I. INTRODUCTION TO NEPA
The NEPA was the first important environmental statute enacted
in the decade of the 1970s when it was signed into law on January 1,
1970.1 Unlike the long and complex statutes dealing with air pollution,
water pollution, and hazardous material that would later be enacted,
NEPA at that time was a five-page statute and the important part of the
Act was one section: 102(2)(C).2 This section requires “every recommenda-
tion or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” to include
“a detailed [environmental impact] statement [(“EIS”)] by the responsible
official.”3 This action-forcing provision requires an environmental impact
statement that includes:
(i.) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii.) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii.) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv.) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man’s environment and the maintenance and en-
hancement of long-term productivity, and
(v.) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed
action should it be implemented.4
1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) [hereinafter NEPA] (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4370h (2017)).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 853.
4 Id.
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This important provision has almost no legislative history.5 More-
over, the legislation initially provided almost no funding, and it failed to
provide for staff to implement the law.6 Congress subsequently added
Title II to the Federal Water Pollution Control amendments of 1970,
which authorized staff for the CEQ.7 The deficiencies of NEPA would have
prevented it from being effective, except for the decisions of the federal
courts in the 1970s that provided the elements needed to make the statute
a useful tool.8 The courts allowed conservation groups to enforce the law
by recognizing their standing based on “federal question” jurisdiction.9
While NEPA does not provide a private right of action, the courts review
the actions of federal agencies as final agency actions that can be re-
viewed based on Section 209 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).10
Jurisdiction is in the federal district courts, and nonfederal litigants can
participate in NEPA cases.11 Although the statute provides no sanctions,
federal courts in the 1970s issued injunctions that prevented projects from
going forward when there was a failure to comply with NEPA.12 The lack
of a budget large enough to implement NEPA was solved by shifting most
of the cost of compliance to the proponent of a project.13 Regulations found
at 40 C.F.R. Parts 1500–1508, discussed infra, have fleshed out the re-
quirements found in the statute.
The first step in the NEPA process is usually to prepare an
Environmental Assessment (“EA”) to determine whether a more compre-
hensive EIS is required.14 A draft EA may be produced by an applicant,
a state, or a consulting firm, but the responsibility for producing the EA
is imposed on the lead federal agency.15 The EA “[s]hall include brief
5 See S.1075; H.R. 6750, 91st Cong. (1969).
6 See generally id.
7 Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 202(c)(2), 84
Stat. 114, 114 (1970).
8 See cases cited infra note 10.
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
10 See Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986); Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 71 (1978); Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating
Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1128–29 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
11 See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173, 1180–81 (9th. Cir. 2011).
12 See, e.g., Wilderness Soc’y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 887–93 (D.D.C. 1973) (enjoining the
Department of Interior from issuing a permit needed to construct the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline); N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Norton, 503 F.3d 836, 841 (9th Cir. 2007).
13 See generally NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–4370h (2017).
14 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(b)–(c) (2018).
15 See, e.g., Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Community v. Zinke,
889 F.3d 584, 600–03, 607 (9th Cir. 2018).
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discussions of the need for the proposal, of alternatives as required by
section 102(2)(E), of the environmental impacts of the proposed action and
alternatives, and a listing of agencies and persons consulted.”16
If the agency’s EA concludes the proposed action has no signifi-
cant impact on the environment, it can choose not to prepare an EIS by
issuing a finding of no significant impact (“FONSI”).17 The D.C. Circuit
uses a four-part test to determine the validity of a FONSI.18 The court will
determine: (1) whether the agency took a “hard look” at the proposal; (2)
whether “the relevant areas of environmental concern” were addressed;
(3) whether the agency made a convincing determination that the envi-
ronmental impact was insignificant; and (4) if the impact is significant,
whether the changes in the proposed project will sufficiently reduce the
adverse environmental impact.19 NEPA’s requirements must be met before
a federal agency makes “any irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
resources.”20 If an EIS is required, a Draft EIS (“DEIS”) is prepared, which
leads to a Final EIS (“FEIS”).21 This is followed by a Record of Decision
(“ROD”) that identifies alternatives considered, as well as the relevant
factors considered by the agency and the mitigation, monitoring, and en-
forcement measures selected.22
NEPA requires federal agencies to promulgate their own regula-
tions to comply with the Act, including identifying actions that normally
require an EA or an EIS and those that do not.23 The Department of
Energy promulgated its regulations on April 24, 1992.24 The Department
of the Interior’s regulations are found in its department manual.25 U.S.
Forest Service regulations are found at 36 C.F.R. 220.26 The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (“EPA”) is treated differently than the other federal
16 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b) (2018).
17 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) (2018).
18 Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
19 Id.
20 Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Conner v. Burford, 848
F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988)).
21 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4, 1502.9 (2018).
22 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (2018).
23 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b)(2)(i)–(iii) (2018).
24 NEPA Implementing Procedures, 57 Fed. Reg. 15,122 (Apr. 24, 1992) (codified as amended
at 10 C.F.R. pt. 1021); 61 Fed. Reg. 64,603 (Dec. 6, 1996) (codified as amended at 10 C.F.R.
pt. 1021).
25 Departmental Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR at pt. 516 (2009), http://elips.doi.gov/elips
/browse.aspx [https://perma.cc/UX4E-TRFW] (follow “Department Manual” folder hyper-
link). BLM’s regulations were promulgated at 73 Fed. Reg. 22,162 (Apr. 24, 2008).
26 36 C.F.R. § 220 (2018).
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agencies, and is largely exempt from the requirements for its Clean Air
Act (“CAA”) activities.27 The NEPA regulations of these agencies are dis-
cussed below.28
After the CEQ regulations were promulgated in 1978, the U.S.
Supreme Court began to restrict the broad interpretations of NEPA de-
veloped by the lower federal courts, particularly the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that NEPA’s
requirements are “essentially procedural,” ending efforts by environmen-
talists to establish substantive rights under NEPA.29 In Strycker’s Bay
Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, the Court reiterated that once an
agency meets its procedural requirements under NEPA, “the only role for
a court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental
consequences” of its actions.30 Today the primary responsibility of the
courts in NEPA cases is to determine whether the federal agency has
taken a hard look at the project covered by the EA or EIS to ensure the
agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact
of the proposed action.31
The first step in a NEPA analysis is to determine whether there
is a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.32 The term “major” reinforces the term “significantly,” but
does not have an independent meaning.33 NEPA is triggered easily.34 If
there is a substantial question concerning whether an action will have
a significant effect, NEPA is triggered.35 However, insignificant actions
such as a one mile per gallon change in the Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standards does not trigger NEPA.36
27 Barry S. Neuman, Implementation of the Clean Air Act: Should NEPA Apply to the
Environmental Protection Agency, 3 ECOLOGY L. Q. 597, 597–98 (1973).
28 See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, § 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 793(c)(1) (2017).
29 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corps. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978).
30 Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 226 (1980).
31 Balt. Gas & Elect. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 98 (1983).
32 NEPA § 102, 83 Stat. 852, 853 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331–70
(2017)).
33 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2018).
34 See, e.g., Anglers of the Au Sable v. U.S. Forest Serv., 565 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815–16 (E.D.
Mich. 2008).
35 See, e.g., Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th
Cir. 1998).
36 Los Angeles v. Nat’l Highway Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 481–82 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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CEQ regulations allow agencies to identify actions that (1) nor-
mally require an EIS; (2) those that normally do not require an EIS,
which are known as categorical exclusions; and (3) those that normally
require an EA but do not necessarily require an EIS.37 A categorical ex-
clusion may not apply under extraordinary circumstances, such as when
the Endangered Species Act is applicable to the subject of an agency’s
review.38 Each agency provides a list of its categorical exclusions.39
NEPA applies to broad federal actions such as new programs or
regulations, which can lead to the need for a Programmatic EIS (“PEIS”).40
Tiering is used to proceed from policy development to site-specific planning
without dealing with issues that were previously adequately covered.41
If new information becomes available after an EIS is completed, a supple-
mental EIS may be needed.42
A. Reasonable Alternatives
One of the most litigated issues involves the CEQ’s regulatory
requirement to consider reasonable alternatives.43 Appropriate alterna-
tives are to be considered for “any proposal which involves unresolved
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.”44 A federal
agency may not take any action that would prejudice the selection of an
alternative action prior to its making a decision on a project.45 The regu-
lations impose six requirements relating to the alternatives analysis.46
They are (1) all reasonable alternatives must be considered and an
explanation is required for any alternative excluded from future study;
(2) each alternative must be considered in a manner that allows review-
ers to evaluate the merits of an option; (3) alternatives outside the
jurisdiction of the agency must be considered; (4) a “no action” alterna-
tive must be considered; (5) a preferred alternative must be identified;
37 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(b) (2018). Categorical exclusions are defined at 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4
(2018).
38 California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 2002).
39 See, e.g., Dep’t of Energy, 10 C.F.R. § 1021, apps. A–B (2018).
40 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(b) (2018). See also CEQ, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EFFECTIVE
USE OF PROGRAMMATIC NEPA REVIEWS (2014).
41 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (2018).
42 Id. § 1508.25.
43 Id. §§ 1500.2(b), 1500.2(e), 1502.13.
44 Id. § 1501.2(c).
45 Id. §§ 1502.2(f), 1506.1(a).
46 Id. § 1502.14.
2018] DEALING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 179
and (6) mitigation measures for the proposed action and for alternatives
must be considered.47 Direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts are to be
considered.48 However, alternatives that are not reasonably available
need not be considered.49 Moreover, alternatives that are not brought to
an agency’s attention need not be evaluated.50 Cumulative impacts occur
if an action, when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions, can collectively have a significant impact on the environ-
ment.51 This type of impact is particularly relevant to issues of climate
change. However, whether climate change must be considered when evalu-
ating alternatives is controversial, and is discussed below.
B. Mitigation
The CEQ regulations require agencies to discuss potential mitiga-
tion measures.52 Guidance concerning NEPA’s requirements for mitigation
and monitoring of GHG emissions was issued on January 21, 2011.53 This
guidance calls for mitigation measures to be explicitly described and for
measurable performance standards to be included.54 The appendix to the
guidance provides an overview of a regulation adopted by the Department
of the Army, which the CEQ uses as a model for mitigation and monitoring
efforts.55 Mitigation efforts can reduce the potentially significant environ-
mental effects of proposed actions that would otherwise require an EIS,
which could allow the agency to issue a FONSI, or a “mitigated FONSI”
if mitigation is used to support the FONSI.56 Monitoring is required for
47 Id.
48 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c) (2018). In doing a cumulative impact analysis, an agency must
assess the impact the proposed project will have in conjunction with other projects in the
same and surrounding areas and must include past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions of any agency or person. WildEarth Guardians v. Bureau of Land Mgmt.,
8 F. Supp. 3d 17, 31 (D.D.C. 2014).
49 See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834–35 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (con-
cluding that oil and gas lease sale off Louisiana’s coast need not consider oil shale, tar
sands, geothermal energy, or other undeveloped alternative energy sources). See also
Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1174–75 (10th Cir. 1999).
50 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 519, 553–54.
51 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2018).
52 Id. §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h), 1505.2(c), 1508.25(b)(3) (2018).
53 Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of Miti-
gation and Monitoring and Clarifying the Appropriate Use of Mitigated Findings of No
Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843, 3844 (Jan. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Final Guidance].
54 Id. at 3848.
55 Id. at 3851–52.
56 Id. at 3848.
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mitigation commitments, and the agency is responsible for public dissem-
ination of the information.57
Mitigation includes: (1) avoiding an impact by not taking
a certain action or parts of an action; (2) minimizing an
impact by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action
and its implementation; (3) rectifying an impact by repair-
ing, rehabilitating, or restoring the affected environment;
(4) reducing or eliminating an impact over time, through
preservation and maintenance operations during the life
of the action; and (5) compensating for an impact by replac-
ing or providing substitute resources or environments.58
The extent to which actions must be taken to mitigate climate change is
unresolved.
II. THE CEQ’S GUIDANCE CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF NEPA
TO CLIMATE CHANGE
The CEQ issued “Draft NEPA Guidance on Considerations of the
Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions” on February
18, 2010.59 It affirmed the applicability of NEPA to GHG emissions and
climate change, and urged federal agencies to mitigate adverse impacts
of GHG emission through reduction efforts and adaptation measures.60
Agencies were instructed to perform a NEPA analysis for a proposed action
having an impact on GHG emissions and climate change, and were to
consider alternative actions which could include carbon capture and
sequestration.61 The draft guidance recommended that agencies prepare
assessments when direct annual releases of carbon dioxide equivalent
(CO2e) emissions are 25,000 metric tons per year (“tpy”) or more.62 For
emissions below the 25,000 tpy trigger, the CEQ advised, but did not re-
quire, agencies to conduct similar assessments.63
57 Id. at 3850.
58 Id. at 3847. See also the definition of mitigation at 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2018).
59 CEQ, DRAFT NEPA GUIDANCE ON CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2010).
60 Id. at 1.
61 Id. at 1, 6.
62 Id. at 1, 3.
63 Id. at 1–2. See Neil McAliley, NEPA and Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 41
ELR NEWS & ANALYSIS 10197, 10202 (2011).
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On December 24, 2014, the CEQ promulgated a “Revised Draft
Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in NEPA
Reviews.”64 It superseded the February 18, 2010 guidance, and it made
it clear that GHG evaluations are required for land and resource man-
agement activities.65
This revised draft guidance: (1) Discusses direct, indirect,
and cumulative impacts analysis of a proposed action’s rea-
sonably foreseeable emissions and effects; (2) highlights
the consideration of reasonable alternatives and points to
the need to consider the short-term and long-term effects
and benefits in the alternatives analysis and mitigation to
lower emissions; (3) recommends that agencies use a refer-
ence point to determine when GHG emissions warrant a
quantitative analysis taking into account available GHG
quantification tools and data that are appropriate for pro-
posed agency actions; (4) recommends that an agency select
the appropriate level of action for NEPA review at which
to assess the effects of GHG emissions and climate change,
either at a broad programmatic or landscape-scale level or
at a project- or site-specific level, and that the agency set
forth a reasoned explanation for its approach; (5) counsels
agencies to use the information developed during the NEPA
review to consider alternatives that are more resilient to
the effects of a changing climate; and (6) advises agencies
to use existing information and tools when assessing future
proposed action, and provides examples of some existing
sources of scientific information.66
On August 1, 2016, the CEQ issued “Final Guidance for Federal
Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and the Effects of Climate Change in Environmental Policy Act Reviews.”67
64 Revised Draft Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in NEPA Reviews. 79 Fed.
Reg. 77,802 (Dec. 24, 2014) (superseding “Draft NEPA Guidance on Consideration of the
Effects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions”).
65 Id. at 77,802.
66 Id. See also Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 827 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
67 CEQ, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS
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The guidance was intended to ensure that the analysis of potential GHG
emissions is commensurate with the extent of the effects of the proposed
action.68 CEQ did not expect agencies to develop new NEPA implementa-
tion procedures, but it recommended agencies update their procedures if
necessary.69 Agencies were to consider the effects of a proposed action on
climate change and the effects of climate change on the proposed action.70
Direct and indirect GHG emissions were to be quantified where feasible.71
The guidance provided substantial detail as to what is required, but that
is now irrelevant because on April 5, 2017, the Trump administration
withdrew the CEQ’s 2016 GHG guidance document.72 The guidance was
withdrawn for further consideration, and the withdrawal “does not change
any law, regulation, or other legally binding requirement.”73
On June 20, 2018, CEQ issued an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking that stated it was considering updating its implementing
regulations for the procedural provisions of NEPA.74 It requested com-
ments on the following, lightly edited, twenty questions:
1. Should CEQ’s NEPA regulations be revised to en-
sure that environmental reviews and authorization
decisions involving multiple agencies are conducted
in a manner that is concurrent, synchronized,
timely, and efficient, and if so, how?
2. Should CEQ’s NEPA regulations be revised to
make the NEPA process more efficient by better
AND AGENCIES ON CONSIDERATION OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND THE EFFECTS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT REVIEWS (2016).
68 Id. at 1.
69 Id. at 3.
70 Id. at 4.
71 Id.
72 Withdrawal of Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environ-
mental Policy Act Reviews, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,576, 16,576 (Apr. 5, 2017). See also Dawn
Reeves, Trump Faces Murky Process to Revoke NEPA Climate Guide, Source Says, INSIDE
EPA (Mar. 23, 2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/trump-faces-murky-process-revoke
-nepa-climate-guide-source-says [https://perma.cc/TQ73-L8BM].
73 Withdrawal of Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National Environ-
mental Policy Act Reviews, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,576, 16,576–77.
74 Update to the Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,591, 28,591 (June 20, 2018).
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facilitating agency use of environmental studies,
analysis, and decisions conducted in earlier Fed-
eral, State, tribal or local environmental reviews or
authorization decisions, and if so, how?
3. Should CEQ’s NEPA regulations be revised to en-
sure optimal interagency coordination of environ-
mental reviews and authorization decisions, and if
so, how?
Scope of Review
4. Should the provisions in CEQ’s . . . regulations that
relate to the format and page length of the NEPA
documents and time limits for completion be re-
vised, and if so, how?
5. Should CEQ’s . . . regulations be revised to provide
greater clarity to ensure . . . documents better focus
on significant issues that are relevant and useful
to decisionmakers and the public, and if so, how?
6. Should the provisions in CEQ’s . . . regulations
relating to public involvement be revised to be
more inclusive and efficient, and if so, how?
7. Should definitions of any key terms in the NEPA
regulations, such as Major Federal Action; Effects;
Cumulative Impact; Significantly; Scope; and other
terms found in the statute be revised, and if so, how?
8. Should any new definitions of terms such as Alter-
natives; Purpose and Need; Reasonably Foreseeable;
Trivial Violation; and other NEPA terms be added,
and if so, which terms?
9. Should the provisions in the NEPA regulations
relating to the documents Notice of Intent; Cate-
gorical Exclusions Documentation; Environmental
Assessments; Findings of No Significant Impact;
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Environmental Impact Statements; Records of De-
cision; and Supplements be revised, and if so, how?
10. Should the provisions in . . . NEPA regulations
relating to the timing of agency action be revised,
and if so, how?
11. Should the provisions in . . . NEPA regulations
relating to agency responsibility and the prepara-
tion of documents by contractors and project appli-
cants be revised, and if so, how?
12. Should the provisions in . . . NEPA regulations
relating to programmatic . . . documents and tiering
be revised, and if so, how?
13. Should the provisions in . . . NEPA regulations re-
lating to the appropriate range of alternatives . . .
be eliminated from detailed analysis be revised, and
if so, how?
General
14. Are any specific provisions of the NEPA regula-
tions obsolete? If so, they should be modified, re-
scinded, or replaced.
15. Which provisions of the NEPA regulations can be
updated to reflect new technologies to make the
process more efficient?
16. Are there additional ways NEPA regulations should
be revised to promote coordination of environmental
review and authorization decisions, such as com-
bining other decision documents with the NEPA
analysis, and if so, how?
17. Are there additional ways NEPA regulations should
be revised to improve the efficiency and effective-
ness of NEPA’s implementation, and if so, how?
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18. Are there ways in which NEPA’s regulations could
be clarified concerning the role of tribal govern-
ments, and if so, how?
19. Are there additional ways NEPA’s regulations
should be revised to ensure that agencies apply the
statute in a manner that reduces unnecessary bur-
dens and delays as much as possible, and if so, how?
20. Are there additional ways NEPA regulations related
to mitigation should be revised, and if so, how?75
III. THE WHITE HOUSE PROPOSAL TO STREAMLINE INFRASTRUCTURE
PERMITTING
On February 12, 2018, the Trump administration released a set
of proposals to streamline the federal environmental review process for
infrastructure projects.76 The proposal included a Part 3—Permitting
Principles.77 Among its provisions are amendments to NEPA and other
environmental statutes as well as changes in the roles of federal environ-
mental agencies and the federal courts.78 The changes would include:
Creating a new “One Agency, One Decision” structure for
environmental reviews to encourage collaboration and effec-
tive communication by establishing deadlines and requir-
ing the Permitting Council to either grant agencies an
extension to the deadlines or reassigning the decisions for
the permit to the lead Federal agency.
. . . .
Eliminating redundancies by removing multiple reviews
by multiple agencies.
75 Id. at 28,591–92.
76 Building a Stronger America: President Donald J. Trump’s American Infrastructure
Initiative, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements
/building-stronger-america-president-donald-j-trumps-american-infrastructure-initiative/
[https://perma.cc/88RH-WURU].
77 Legislative Outline for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America, DEPARTMENT OF TRANS-
PORTATION 1, 35 (2018), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/briefing
-room/304441/legoutline.pdf [https://perma.cc/KC4R-H8YD] (last visited Nov. 17, 2018).
78 Id.
186 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:173
. . . .
Delegating more responsibilities to States.
Providing for additional provisions to facilitate environ-
mental reviews across the applicable Federal Agencies.
. . . .
Authorizing pilot programs through which agencies may
experiment with innovative approaches to environmental
reviews while enhancing environmental protections.
Reexamining certain judicial review standards to ensure
that issues are quickly resolved.79
The proposal would change NEPA to require a FONSI or a ROD,
as appropriate, to be issued within twenty-one months.80 Federal agen-
cies and states with federal delegation would then have three months to
make permit decisions.81 If a federal agency fails to meet the deadlines,
its responsibilities, along with an appropriate amount of budgetary au-
thority, could be transferred to a new lead agency.82 The lead agency would
have significantly more authority to limit the influence of other agencies,
including the power to determine the range of alternatives considered.83
The requirement for reasonable alternatives to be considered would be
restricted to alternatives that can legally, technically, and economically
be implemented.84 The CEQ would be required to issue regulations and
guidance to streamline the NEPA process and the EPA would lose its re-
view responsibility under the Clean Air Act’s Section 309.85 The proposal
also provides for expanded use of categorical exclusions.86 In addition to
changes in NEPA, the proposal would change the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, the Endangered Species Act, and other federal statutes to limit
environmental considerations when authorizing infrastructure projects.87
79 Legislative Outline for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America Draft, pt. 3 (2018), https://
www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/0/70544C496B334DB9882582250053DE39/$file/White
-House-Draft-Plan-to-Streamline-Federal.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR9U-UJPR].
80 Id. § 3000.
81 Id.
82 Id. See also Trump Permitting Plan Would Scale Back NEPA, Limiting EPA’s Reviews,
INSIDE EPA (Feb. 9, 2018), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/trump-permitting-plan-would
-scale-back-nepa-limiting-epas-reviews [https://perma.cc/886Q-3MAU].
83 Legislative Outline for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America Draft, supra note 79, at
§§ 3001, 3002, 3003.
84 Id. § 3005.
85 Id. §§ 3006–07.
86 Id. §§ 3009, 3405.
87 Id. §§ 3013–3302.
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The Trump administration also seeks to narrow the scope of judicial
review by exempting certain actions or issues from review by the courts.88
Categorical exclusions created by federal agencies would not be subject
to judicial review.89 Moreover, courts could stop a project only under ex-
ceptional circumstances,90 and the statute of limitations for challenges
would be cut from up to five years to 150 days.91
IV. EXECUTIVE ORDERS RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE
NEPA’s requirements have been expanded by Executive Orders
(“E.O.s”), which include requirements directed at climate change. Former
President Bush’s E.O. 13,423 directs each federal agency to reduce their
energy intensity and increase their use of renewable energy.92 President
Obama’s E.O. 13,514, issued on October 5, 2009, expanded the require-
ments of E.O. 13,423.93 Guidance for implementing E.O. 13,514 was pro-
mulgated on March 4, 2011.94 It required that each agency address the
challenges posed by climate change to its mission, programs, and opera-
tions: “Federal agencies shall increase energy efficiency; measure, report,
and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions from direct and indirect ac-
tivities.”95 This requires the development of a “Strategic Sustainability
Performance Plan” that includes GHG reduction targets for GHG emissions
from the sources controlled by a federal agency and from sources generating
electricity purchased by a federal agency.96 Section 16 of the E.O. requires
the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force to develop recom-
mendations for federal agencies to guide them in developing climate
adaptation plans.97 The Task Force’s recommendations were adopted by
88 Id. §§ 3401–06.
89 Legislative Outline for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America Draft, supra note 79, at
§ 3405.
90 Id. § 3402.
91 Id. §§ 3403–04.
92 Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management,
Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3,919 (Jan. 26, 2007).
93 Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, Exec.
Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 8, 2009).
94 CEQ, Federal Agency Climate Change Adaptation Planning: Implementation Instructions
(Mar. 4, 2011), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1108/ML110811218.pdf [https://perma.cc/TR
Q8-7HS3].
95 Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 52,117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
96 Id. at 52,117 and 52,126.
97 INTERAGENCY CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE, Progress Report of the Inter-
agency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force: Recommended Actions in Support of a
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the CEQ.98 By June 4, 2012, each agency was to submit to the CEQ and
to the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) its climate adaptation
plan, which was to be made publicly available, for fiscal year 2013.99 In
2010, the federal government announced it would reduce its GHG emis-
sions 28 percent by 2020 based on the aggregate of 35 federal agencies’
self-reported targets.100
After Donald Trump became president in 2017, a seismic change
in the nation’s environmental policy occurred. Public health concerns are
now secondary to expanding the production of fossil fuels. Minimizing
the costs imposed on the regulated community is now a paramount con-
cern when regulatory programs are developed and implemented.101 After
taking office, President Trump almost immediately issued E.O. 13,771,
which requires agencies to eliminate two regulations when a new regula-
tion is promulgated and to fully offset the cost of any new regulation.102
This E.O. has been subject to significant criticism from economists.103 On
March 1, 2017, a regulatory process was established by E.O. 13,777 to
comply with E.O. 13,771.104 Each agency is to follow this process when
recommending rules to be eliminated.105 On April 5, 2017, the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs issued guidance to the agencies to
implement the two-for-one regulatory mandate.106 The E.O. makes it more
National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy 2 (2010), https://web.archive.org/web/2016
1201153437/https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency
-Climate-Change-Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TXT-HY5F].
98 CEQ, supra note 94.
99 Id.
100 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Obama Sets Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Reduction Target for Federal Operations (Jan. 29, 2010), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-sets-greenhouse-gas-emissions-reduction-tar
get-federal-operations [https://perma.cc/HQ94-J4U4].
101 See Cheryl Hogue, Trump administration is considering reweighing costs and benefits
of EPA regulations, CHEM. & ENG’G NEWS (Aug. 5, 2018), https://cen.acs.org/policy
/regulation/Trump-administration-considering-reweighing-costs/96/i32 [https://perma.cc
/47AE-XZWR].
102 Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82
Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
103 Dave Reynolds, Agency Economists Say 2–1 Order ‘Doubles’ Benefit-Cost Analysis Work,
INSIDE EPA (Oct. 2, 2017).
104 Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285
(Mar. 1, 2017).
105 Id.
106 Doug Obey, OMB Guide Highlights Burdens EPA Faces Issuing Rules Under 2–1
Order, INSIDE EPA (May 1, 2017), https://insideepa.com/daily-news/omb-guide-highlights
-burdens-epa-faces-issuing-rules-under-2-1-order [https://perma.cc/VV6G-MDLM].
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difficult to develop regulations and increases the work load for EPA at a
time when its budget and personnel are being cut.
On March 27, 2017, President Trump signed legislation repealing
the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)’s
Planning 2.0 regulation.107 The Planning 2.0 Rule was promulgated at
the end of the Obama administration.108 Led by conservative western
members of Congress, the House passed a resolution of disapproval of the
2.0 regulation on February 7, 2017, based on the authority granted by
the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”).109 On March 7, 2017, the Senate
passed a resolution of disapproval.110 After the President signed the legis-
lation, the CRA statute lead to the Planning 2.0 Rule being treated as if
it had never taken effect. Thus, the planning requirements returned to
the pre–January 11, 2017, regulations, which are the 1983 regulations
that are far less protective of the environment.111 Subsequently, the De-
partment of Interior published a rule removing the voided text of the rule
and nullified any actions made by the rule.112 The demise of the Planning
2.0 Rule is considered by environmentalists to be a serious blow to
improved management of public lands, which includes the need for better
protection of the environment from the energy industry’s operations.113
While NEPA’s procedural requirements still apply to BLM’s planning
activities, the more rigorous substantive requirements of the 2.0 Rule
have been revoked.
President Trump issued E.O. 13,783, “Promoting Energy Inde-
pendence and Economic Growth,” on March 28, 2017.114 This Order directs
all executive branch agencies to review existing regulations for burden-
some effects on the “[s]afe, [e]fficient [d]evelopment of [d]omestic [e]nergy
107 Pub. L. No. 115-12, 131 Stat. 76 (2017).
108 Resource Management Planning Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580 (Dec. 12, 2016).
109 H.R.J. Res. 44, 115th Cong. (2017). The CRA can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 801 (2018). See
also RIPON ADVANCE NEWS SERV., Trump signs repeal of BLM Planning 2.0 regulation
under Congressional Review Act, THE RIPON ADVANCE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://riponad
vance.com/stories/trump-signs-repeal-blm-planning-2-0-regulation-congressional-review
-act/ [https://perma.cc/98WC-2MLP].
110 H.J. Res. 15 (Mar. 7, 2017) CONG. REC. S1686–S1687.
111 See, e.g., Bobby McEnaney, Congress Kills BLM’s Planning 2.0 Rule, NAT. RES. DEF.
COUNCIL BLOG (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/bobby-mcenaney/congress
kills-blms-planning-20-rule [https://perma.cc/S8ZT-XDVG]
112 Effectuating Congressional Nullification of the Resource Management Planning Rule
Under the Congressional Review Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,554, 60,554 (Dec. 21, 2017) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 1600).
113 McEnaney, supra note 111.
114 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
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[s]ources.”115 More specifically, the Order rescinds Obama-era energy- and
climate-related regulatory actions, including E.O. 13,653, “Preparing the
United States for the Impacts of Climate Change,” and three Presidential
Memoranda: “Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards,” “Mitigating
Impacts on Natural Resources From Development and Encouraging
Related Private Investment,” and “Climate Change and National Secu-
rity.”116 The Order also rescinds the 2013 Climate Action Plan and the
2014 Climate Action Plan Strategy to Reduce Methane Emissions.117
Additionally, the Order disbands the Interagency Working Group on the
Social Cost of Carbon, Nitrous Oxide, and Methane for Regulatory Im-
pact Analysis (“IWG”).118 Established in 2010, the IWG was responsible
for a yearly social cost-benefit analysis of GHG emissions based on the
most recent climate change science findings.119 The new Order directs
that any further cost-benefit reports done by any executive branch
agency be based on guidance contained in the OMB A-4 Circular of
September 17, 2003.120
E.O. 13,783 grants significant autonomy to both EPA’s Adminis-
trator and the Secretary of the Interior. For example, former Administra-
tor Pruitt was directed to “suspend, revise, or rescind the guidance,” of
Obama-era EPA regulations pertaining to GHG emissions from all sta-
tionary energy sources and all oil and natural gas development sources,
wherever such action is lawful and consistent with the main theme of
unburdening domestic energy production.121 Section 6 of the E.O. directs
the Secretary of Interior to “lift any and all moratoria on Federal land
coal leasing activities,” as well as suspension, revision, or rescission of
federal regulations restricting oil, gas, and hydraulic fracturing on fed-
eral and Indian lands.122 This attempt to revitalize the nation’s coal
industry is the most specifically criticized element of the E.O. However,
despite the Trump administration’s support of the fossil fuel industry, it
is unlikely that coal will be able to effectively compete with the less
expensive and cleaner natural gas alternative.123
115 Id. at 16,093.
116 Id. at 16,094.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 16,095.
119 Id.
120 Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82
Fed. Reg. 16,093, 16,096.
121 Id. at 16,095.
122 Id. at 16,096.
123 Andrew Childers, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Drop as Gas Replaces Coal Power,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Feb. 14, 2017).
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Agencies are not to spend more than a year analyzing the environ-
mental impacts of major actions, and the final report may not exceed 150
pages or 300 pages for unusually complex projects.124 This will affect
BLM’s regulations promulgated on December 12, 2016, on the prepara-
tion of land use plans to include both the effect of the proposed action on
climate change and the effect of climate change on the proposed action.125
As previously mentioned, the Trump administration seeks to use its
infrastructure plan to reduce environmental reviews under many envi-
ronmental laws and substantially limit the public’s ability to use the
federal courts to challenge project approvals.126
As required by Executive Order 13,783, EPA released its “Energy
Independence Report” on October 25, 2017.127 It calls for reducing the
regulatory burden on energy resource companies through (1) New Source
Review reform; (2) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”)
reform; (3) robust evaluations of employment effects of EPA regulations;
and (4) a “Smart Sector” program through which EPA is seeking input
from trade associations on co-operative problem-solving.128
On May 17, 2018, President Trump signed Executive Order
13,834, titled Efficient Federal Operations.129 It revoked Executive Order
13,693 of March 19, 2015, Planning for Federal Sustainability in the
Next Decade.130 In Section 2, E.O. 13,693 created percentage reduction
targets for agency wide reductions in GHG emissions to reduce emissions
by the end of 2025 relative to the fiscal year 2008 baseline.131 In addition
to President Trump’s removing the need to reduce GHG emissions, the
E.O. directs the heads of the Departments of Agriculture, Energy, Gen-
eral Services Administration, and EPA in conjunction with the CEQ to
124 Michael Doyle, Order limits most NEPA studies to a year, 150 pages, E&E NEWS
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060059865 [https://perma.cc
/P4BR-CN8B].
125 Resource Management Planning Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 89,580.
126 Alan Kovski, Infrastructure Plan Calls for Changes to Environmental Laws, BLOOMBERG
ENV’T (Feb. 12, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/in
frastructure-plan-calls-for-changes-to-environmental-laws [https://perma.cc/VYQ7-M6F8].
127 EPA, EPA Releases Energy Independence Report (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.epa.gov
/newsreleases/epa-releases-energy-independence-report [https://perma.cc/48Q3-Y4Y9].
128 David LaRoss, EPA Touts Four ‘Key’ Policy Reform Efforts to Boost Trump’s Energy
Order, INSIDE EPA (Oct. 25, 2017).
129 Efficient Federal Operations, Exec. Order No. 13,834, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,771 (May 17, 2018).
130 Id. at 23,773.
131 Planning for Federal Sustainability in the Next Decade, Exec. Order No. 13,693, 80
Fed. Reg. 15,871 (Mar. 25, 2015).
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review government guidance related to energy and environmental perfor-
mance and develop a plan to modify, replace, or rescind such guidance.132
On August 15, 2017, E.O. 13,807 directed CEQ to develop an initial
list of actions to enhance and modernize the federal environmental review
and authorization process.133 In response, CEQ stated that it intends to
review NEPA’s existing regulations in order to identify changes needed
to update and clarify these regulations.134 This resulted in the June 20,
2018, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking previously discussed.135
V. SPECIFIC AGENCY NEPA REGULATIONS
As mentioned previously, NEPA requires all federal agencies to
review their statutory authority, administrative regulations, procedures,
and policies to determine whether there are any deficiencies or inconsis-
tencies that prevent full compliance with NEPA.136 The NEPA regulations
promulgated by several federal agencies with environmental responsi-
bilities are briefly discussed below. However, the agencies have largely
ignored the issue of what role GHG emissions and climate change should
play when carrying out their mission responsibilities.
A. The Department of Energy’s NEPA Regulations
The Department of Energy (“DOE”) promulgated regulations to
supplement CEQ’s regulations.137 Subpart A of the regulations covers the
general applicability of NEPA to DOE.138 DOE’s regulations include added
definitions to the CEQ regulations.139 DOE’s General Counsel is responsi-
ble for overseeing NEPA compliance.140 Subpart B, which guides DOE’s
NEPA compliance, parallels the CEQ’s regulations. The DOE regulations
132 Efficient Federal Operations, Exec. Order No. 13,834, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,771, 23,771–72
(May 17, 2018).
133 Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Per-
mitting Process for Infrastructure Projects, Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463,
40,466 (Aug. 24, 2017).
134 Id. at 40,467.
135 Update to the Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act, 83 Fed. Reg. at 28,591.
136 NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (2018).
137 NEPA Implementing Procedures, 10 C.F.R. § 1021.100 (2018).
138 Id. § 1021.102(a) (stating that NEPA applies to the entire DOE with the exception of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
139 Id. § 1021.104(b).
140 Id. § 1021.105.
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cover the level of review required for a project or action,141 including re-
search and development activities, rulemaking, adjudicatory proceedings,
applications for permits and licenses, and government procurement and
financial assistance.142
Subpart C regulates the procedures implementing NEPA.143 It
covers the preparation of EAs and EISs and the applicability of exclu-
sions.144 It covers the use of an EA, a FONSI, a programmatic EA or EIS,
and of mitigation action plans.145 Subpart C also covers public review of
an EIS.146 DOE must publish a ROD in the Federal Register before action
is taken on a proposal.147
Subpart D discusses the level of review for typical actions taken by
DOE.148 Appendix A of this section identifies categorical exclusions ap-
plicable to general agency actions.149 Appendix B identifies the categorical
exclusions applicable to specific agency actions.150 Categorical exclusions
must not violate applicable laws or adversely affect environmentally
sensitive resources.151 Appendix C covers classes of actions that normally
require an EA but not necessarily an EIS, and Appendix D deals with
classes of actions that usually require an EIS.152
DOE’s regulations adopt CEQ’s regulations concerning implement-
ing NEPA.153 However, DOE’s regulations provide no guidance concerning
the treatment of climate change issues.
B. The Department of the Interior and its BLM NEPA
Requirements
The U.S. Department of the Interior’s (“DOI”) NEPA policy is found
in its departmental manual.154 Series 31 of the manual deals with environ-
mental quality programs.155 Part 516 deals with NEPA, and it is focused
141 Id. § 1021.200(c).
142 Id. §§ 1021.212–1021.216.
143 10 C.F.R. § 1021.300.
144 Id. §§ 1021.300–1021.311.
145 Id. §§ 1021.321–1021.331.
146 Id. § 1021.313.
147 Id. §§ 1021.315(b)–(d).
148 Id. § 1021.400.
149 10 C.F.R. § 1021(D), app. A.
150 10 C.F.R. § 1021(D), app. B.
151 Id. § 1021(D), app. B.B(4).
152 Id. § 1021(D), apps. C–D.
153 10 C.F.R. § 1021.103.
154 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 25.
155 Id. at ser. 31.
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on the nuts and bolts of compliance.156 Part 516, chapter 11 of the manual
covers the BLM’s oversight of the NEPA process.157 Part 523 deals with
climate change adaptation, but it does not provide much useful guidance.158
It includes the Handbook, 707 DM1—Agency Specific Procedures for Imple-
menting the Council on Environmental Quality’s Principles, Requirements,
and Guidelines for Water and Land Related Resources Implementation
Studies.159 The DOI Departmental Manual Part 516, chapter 11, Manag-
ing the NEPA Process—Bureau of Land Management, 516 DM 11.3, pro-
vides guidance for applicants.160 This chapter provides supplementary
requirements for implementing provisions of 516 DM Chapters 1 through
6 for the DOI’s BLM.161 It incorporates CEQ and DOI requirements as they
apply to BLM’s operations, including a list of the type of BLM actions that
will normally require an EIS and a list of actions eligible for a categorical
exclusion.162 What it does not do is provide any useful guidance concerning
dealing with issues involving climate change.
The BLM’s NEPA Handbook (H-1790-1) provides additional guid-
ance for applicants.163 The BLM Handbook includes within its NEPA
processes an evaluation of whether a project complies with any applica-
ble land use plan (“LUP”).164 If a project does not conform to the LUP it
may be modified in order to conform or the LUP may be modified to allow
the proposed action.165 If neither of these approaches satisfies the LUP,
the proposal must be abandoned.166
Projects funded by BLM or on lands managed by BLM require
NEPA analysis.167 Projects on land not managed by BLM require NEPA
compliance if BLM has sufficient control over the action, such that the
156 Id. at ser. 31, pt. 516.
157 Id. at ser. 31, pt. 516, Chapter 11.
158 Id. at ser. 31, pt. 523.
159 DOI, Agency Specific Procedures for Implementing the Council on Environmental Quality’s
Principles, Requirements, and Guidelines for Water and Land Related Resources Implementa-
tion Studies, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/elips/documents/707_dm_.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GL5S-NTHH].
160 U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, supra note 25, at pt. 516, ch. 11.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 BLM, National Environmental Policy Act Handbook H-1790-1 (Jan. 2008), https://
www.ntc.blm.gov/krc/uploads/366/NEPAHandbook_H-1790_508.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZKX5-CD79] [hereinafter BLM Handbook].
164 Id. at 6.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 15.
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effects can be evaluated.168 Projects involving mineral estates where BLM
manages the surface and subsurface trigger NEPA analysis.169 If BLM man-
ages the subsurface and another federal agency manages the surface,
NEPA applies but BLM must establish a cooperative agency relationship.170
Categorical exclusions allow a federal action to comply with NEPA
without obtaining an EA or an EIS.171 The Energy Policy Act of 2005
provides a rebuttable presumption that specified activities involving oil
and gas exploration and development activities are categorically ex-
cluded.172 Appendix Four of the BLM Handbook lists categorical exclu-
sions under subject headings such as: (1) oil, gas, and geothermal energy;
(2) realty; (3) solid minerals; and (4) transportation.173 However, Appen-
dix Five of the BLM Handbook lists twelve extraordinary circumstances,
including actions with controversial or unknown environmental effects,
that mandate preparation of an EA or an EIS.174 In addition, the BLM
Handbook (H-1790-1) lists categorical exclusions adopted by the Depart-
ment of the Interior.175 Chapter Six of the BLM Handbook examines the
NEPA analysis process.176 Part 6.8 deals with environmental effects, but
it provides no specific guidance on the treatment of climate change.177
Moreover, on June 6, 2018, BLM issued an information bulletin explain-
ing the various ways that the agency can avoid issuing an EA or an
EIS.178 However, even if NEPA is applicable and the agency produces an
EA or an EIS, there is no assurance that climate change impacts will be
addressed. For example, on July 12, 2018, BLM released its final EIS for
the Alton Coal Tract Lease covering 3,581 acres of federal coal resources
on lands near Alton, Utah.179 No mention of the effects on climate change
were included.180
168 Id.
169 BLM Handbook, supra note 163, at 16.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 17.
172 Id. app. 2 at 141.
173 Id. app. 4 at 147–53.
174 Id. app. 5 at 155.
175 BLM Handbook, supra note 163, at 17.
176 Id. at 33.
177 Id. at 54–63.
178 BLM, NEPA Efficiencies for Oil and Gas Development, Information Bulletin 2018061
(June 6, 2018), https://www.blm.gov/policy/ib-2018-061 [https://perma.cc/D7ZK-6UVQ].
179 BLM Releases Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Alton Coal Tract, BLM
(Jul. 12, 2018), https://www.blm.gov/press-release/blm-releases-final-environmental-im
pact-statement-alton-coal-tract [https://perma.cc/K4QB-R5K4].
180 Id.
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C. The EPA’s NEPA Requirements
The EPA is not required to comply with NEPA for most of its
actions. The Clean Air Act (“CAA”) exempts the Agency from the require-
ments of NEPA.181 Under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), EPA must comply
with the procedural requirements of NEPA for only a limited number of
actions, which include its research and development activities, facilities
construction, wastewater treatment construction grants, EPA-issued
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permits for
new sources, and for certain projects funded through EPA’s annual
Appropriations Acts.182 The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA” or “Superfund”) also exempts
EPA from the procedural requirements of environmental laws for its re-
sponse actions.183 Court decisions have held EPA’s procedures to be
functionally equivalent to the NEPA process and therefore exempt from
NEPA’s procedural requirements.184 EPA has been voluntarily preparing
EAs for many years on a case-by-case basis, and it sometimes prepares
an EIS when the Agency believes it could be beneficial.185 EPA’s policy
document lists the criteria for making such a determination.186
EPA has played an oversight role by reviewing NEPA activities
of other Federal agencies. Section 309 of the Clean Air Act gives EPA the
responsibility for reviewing and commenting on the environmental impact
of legislation, federal construction projects, major federal actions, and pro-
posed regulations published by any federal agency.187 This allows EPA to
influence federal agency actions, and if its Administrator determines any
legislation, action, or regulation adversely impacts public health, welfare,
or environmental quality, the matter can be referred to the CEQ.188
In 2011 the Department of Agriculture (on behalf of the Forest
Service), and EPA disseminated a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”)
concerning air quality analyses and mitigation for federal oil and gas
decisions through NEPA.189 The MOU establishes a common NEPA process
181 See Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 793(c)(1).
182 Notice of Policy and Procedures for Voluntary Preparation of National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) Documents, 63 Fed. Reg. 58,045, 58,046 (Oct. 29, 1998) [hereinafter
Notice of Policy and Procedures]. See also 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1).
183 Notice of Policy and Procedures, supra note 182, at 58,046.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 58,047.
187 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a).
188 CAA § 309(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2000).
189 MOU Among the U.S. Dep’t of Agric., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, & U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, Regarding Air Quality Analyses & Mitigation for Federal Oil & Gas Decisions
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for agencies to implement in analyzing air quality impacts and “air qual-
ity related values” (“AQRVs”), such as visibility for onshore federal oil and
gas planning, leasing, or field development on federal lands.190 The MOU
limits its scope to emissions associated with achieving the NAAQS and
AQRVs.191 It states the emissions of hazardous air pollutants (“HAPs”) and
GHGs are not included.192 If EPA determines the MOU procedures have
been followed the EIS’s air quality analysis will be considered adequate.193
However, future laws or regulations may require additional analysis, and
a satisfactory analysis does not mean impacts will be environmentally
satisfactory.194 If a federal land management agency follows the best
practices established by the MOU in its NEPA-based air quality and
AQRVs analyses, EPA will rate the analyses “adequate,” and no further
NEPA-based procedure is required.195 It is not clear that EPA’s oversight
role will continue during the Trump administration.196
VI. NEPA LITIGATION INVOLVING CLIMATE CHANGE ISSUES
For about two decades, courts have decided cases that sought to en-
force NEPA’s EIS requirements in order to force the government to deal
with climate change. For example, in Border Power Plant Working Group
v. Dep’t of Energy, a federal district court in 2003 held that an EA for a fed-
eral action contravened NEPA because it failed to disclose and analyze
potential environmental impacts related to the construction of a power
line transmitting electricity from new power plants in Mexico to Southern
California.197 This body of caselaw includes requiring NEPA compliance
for international actions impacting the U.S.198 A chronological coverage
of major NEPA cases dealing with climate change follows.
Through the Nat’l Envtl. Pol’y Act Process 1 (June 24, 2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites
/production/files/2014-08/documents/air-quality-analyses-mou-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc
/S9RM-W6C6] [hereinafter MOU].
190 Id.
191 Id. at 12.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 2.
194 Id. at 12.
195 MOU, supra note 189, at 2, 12.
196 See, e.g., Notice Regarding Withdrawal of Obligation to Submit Information, 82 Fed.
Reg. 12817, 12817 (Mar. 7, 2017).
197 Border Power Plant Working Group v. Dep’t of Energy, 260 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1029 (S.D.
Cal. 2003).
198 CEQ, MEMORANDUM TO HEADS OF AGENCIES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT TO PROPOSED FEDERAL ACTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH
TRANSBOUNDARY EFFECTS 3 (1997), https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceq-regulations-and-guidance
/memorandum-transboundary-impacts-070197.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YA5-72E4].
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In Mid States Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transportation
Board, the Eighth Circuit in 2003 held that the Surface Transportation
Board (“STB”) did not fully comply with NEPA because it failed to con-
sider potential increases in emissions resulting from the creation of a new
rail line.199 The petitioners challenged the STB’s approval of 280 miles of
new rail line and improvements to 600 miles of existing rail line that
crossed the states of Minnesota and South Dakota in order to deliver coal
from the Powder River Basin (“PRB”) in Wyoming.200 The expansion and
improvement raised a number of environmental issues, including a sub-
stantial increase in train traffic, a corresponding increase in noise levels
in the city of Rochester, Minnesota, and reduced air quality due to an
increased use of low-sulfur coal.201 The Sierra Club argued there would be
a significant increase in air pollutants, including carbon dioxide.202
The court held that the direct and indirect environmental effects
of a federal action causing degradation in air quality must be addressed
in an EIS if the effects are “reasonably foreseeable.”203 The court found
the STB “completely ignored the effects of increased coal consumption”
and that the requirements within the CEQ regulations were not fulfilled;
therefore “it would be irresponsible for the [STB] to approve a project of
this scope without first examining the effects that may occur as a result
of the reasonably foreseeable increase in coal consumption.”204 The court
remanded the case to the STB.205 The STB subsequently prepared a sup-
plemental EIS that the Eighth Circuit found to be adequate.206
In Center for Biological Diversity v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, the Ninth Circuit in 2008 found numerous failures to com-
ply with NEPA, including a failure to fully consider the aggregate im-
pacts that GHG emissions have on climate change.207 Moreover, the court
found the final rule failed to adequately examine the monetary value of
199 Midstates Coalition for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 548–50 (8th Cir.
2003).
200 Id. at 532.
201 Id. at 534–40, 548.
202 Id. at 548.
203 Id. at 549 (citing Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st. Cir. 1992) (finding that
an effect is reasonably foreseeable when it is “sufficiently likely to occur that a person of
ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a decision”)).
204 Id. at 550.
205 Midstates Coalition, 345 F.3d at 556.
206 Mayo Found. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 472 F.3d 545, 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2006).
207 Ctr. For Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172
(9th. Cir. 2008).
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carbon emissions.208 The petitioners, including eleven states, the District
of Columbia, cities, and public interest groups, sought review of the Corpo-
rate Average Fuel Economy (“CAFE”) standards promulgated by the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”), which required
light trucks to meet certain fuel economy specifications.209 They alleged
violations of NEPA and the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975.210
The court was critical of the cumulative analysis found in the EA
because the new CAFE standards did not consider how emissions would
impact climate change, nor would the standards offset the emissions
resulting from a greater number of light trucks.211 Under the cumulative
impacts regulation, agencies must review the current action together with
“other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future [government]
actions.”212 The court found that, pursuant to NEPA, agencies should
conduct cumulative impacts analysis on GHG emissions’ effect on climate
change.213 The Ninth Circuit concluded the EA was “markedly deficient
in its attempt to justify the refusal to prepare a complete environmental
impact statement” and remanded the case to NHTSA to prepare either
an updated EA or, if needed, an EIS.214
In South Fork Band v. U.S. Department of the Interior, the Ninth
Circuit in 2009 held that indirect effects that impact air quality must be
considered under NEPA.215 Indirect effects include those “caused by the
action, [and] later in time or further removed in distance, [but] still rea-
sonably foreseeable.”216 Because the Supreme Court has held that carbon
dioxide is a pollutant, its emissions would appear to be subject to the
indirect effects rule.217
Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of the Interior,
decided by the D.C. Circuit in 2009, involved a challenge to the Federal
Leasing Program under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”)
involving offshore oil and gas development in the waters off of Alaska’s
coast.218 The case included both NEPA and Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)
208 Id. at 1172, 1198–1203.
209 Id. at 1180–81. See 49 C.F.R. § 533 (1978).
210 Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1181, 1193.
211 Id. at 1216.
212 Id. at 1217 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 533 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1219.
215 South Fork Band v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 2009).
216 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b)(1977).
217 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 529 (2007).
218 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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claims.219 The court ruled that the challengers had procedural standing
under both OCSLA and NEPA, but that some of the claims were not ripe
for review.220 The court then vacated and remanded the Leasing Pro-
gram.221 Petitioners alleged violations of both OCSLA and NEPA because
the Department of the Interior “failed to consider both the economic and
environmental costs of the greenhouse gas emissions associated with the
Program and the effects of climate change on OCS areas.”222
The court, in denying a substantive right to standing, distinguished
Massachusetts v. EPA by finding that case was limited to a sovereign
(Massachusetts) suing to protect its own interests.223 Petitioners’ sub-
stantive theory that climate change in the Arctic environment may occur
due to the DOI’s Leasing Program was not an injury-in-fact that met the
requirements of Article III because it was not actual or imminent as
required by the law of standing.224 In addition, since humanity as a whole
shares in the repercussions of climate change, the alleged injury to the
petitioners was too broad to warrant standing.225 The NEPA-based claims
were not ripe because the obligation to comply with NEPA had not yet
occurred.226 The OCSLA-based climate change claims were also dis-
missed.227 However, the Leasing Program was vacated based on the chal-
lenge to the environmental sensitivity rankings, which resulted in the
Leasing Program being remanded to the Secretary for reconsideration.228
In WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, environmental organizations
in 2013 used NEPA to challenge BLM’s decision to authorize coal leases in
Wyoming.229 Antelope Coal, LLC, had submitted an application to BLM in
2005 seeking a competitive lease sale for a parcel of federal land.230 BLM’s
March 2010 ROD split the land into two parcels (the West Antelope II
tracts), and authorized separate competitive bidding processes for the
leases.231 WildEarth Guardians and other environmental groups chal-
lenged BLM’s decision to approve leases for the West Antelope II tracts
219 Id.
220 Id. at 472.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 475.
223 Id. at 476–77 (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
224 Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d at 478.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 483.
227 Id. at 472.
228 Id.
229 WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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for lease based on alleged deficiencies in the FEIS that accompanied the
ROD.232 The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,
rejecting some of the plaintiffs’ arguments on the merits, and preventing
the plaintiffs from raising another argument because they lacked stand-
ing on that claim.233 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit concluded there was
standing, but the petitioners lost on the merits, and the judgment of the
district court was affirmed.234
EPA published a FEIS of nearly 500 pages in 2008, which included
BLM’s answers to public comments submitted on the draft EIS.235 On
March 25, 2010, BLM approved Antelope Coal’s application in a ROD, and
divided the land into two lots, with each to be leased according to a com-
petitive bidding process.236 Antelope Coal successfully bid for both leases,
and in 2011, the leases went into effect.237 Appellants claimed that the
BLM ROD failed to sufficiently consider heightened levels of local pollution,
as well as climate change.238 The court held the environmental organi-
zations may challenge all FEIS shortcomings because each error repre-
sented a procedural injury related to plaintiffs’ “members’ recreational and
aesthetic injuries.”239 The court also considered only two of the appellants’
challenges to the FEIS worth discussing.240
The court looked at whether BLM had taken a “hard look” at the
impact its leasing decision could have on climate change.241 BLM had in-
cluded a detailed discussion of the current scientific consensus on climate
change and how coal mining adds to it.242 BLM predicted that only 0.63
percent of CO2e emissions statewide could be connected to anticipated GHG
emissions at the Antelope Mine, although BLM admittedly speculated
about future emissions projections.243 Moreover, BLM noted possible in-
accuracies in these future emissions projections, and did not preclude the
possibility of new regulatory and technological developments altering
those numbers.244 The court quoted draft guidance from the CEQ saying
232 Id.
233 Id. at 302.
234 Id. at 312.
235 WildEarth Guardians, 738 F.3d at 312.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 304.
238 Id. at 304–05.
239 Id. at 305–06.
240 Id. at 308–11.
241 WildEarth Guardians, 738 F.3d at 308.
242 Id. at 308–09.
243 Id. at 309.
244 Id.
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“it is not currently useful to attempt to link specific climatological changes,
or the environmental impacts thereof, to the particular projects or emis-
sions.”245 The court found that, “[b]ecause current science does not allow
for the specificity demanded by the Appellants, the BLM was not required
to identify specific effects on the climate in order to prepare an adequate
EIS.”246 The court also considered the need to take a “hard look” at local
air pollution impacts, but this issue is not related to the subject of this
Article.247 The court concluded that “[t]he NEPA process involves an almost
endless series of judgment calls,” and “the line-drawing decisions necessi-
tated by the NEPA process are vested in the agencies, not the courts.”248
In WildEarth Guardians v. BLM, the U.S. District Court of the
District of D.C. in 2014 decided a case in which environmental organi-
zations contested a BLM-granted coal mining lease on public lands in
Wyoming.249 The case was based on alleged violations of NEPA and the
Federal Land Policy Management Act.250 The environmental organiza-
tions were unsuccessful, but the court did rule on the FEIS’s treatment
of climate change. The plaintiffs claimed that BLM did not complete a
proper analysis of the direct CO2 emissions from the leases, the aggre-
gate climate effects of the two leases considered in light of existing leases
on the same lands, or the aggregate indirect effects from combustion re-
sulting from operations authorized by the leases.251 However, the court
rejected the plaintiffs’ challenges because their proposed level of analysis
“was neither possible based on current science, nor required by law.”252
BLM recognized that GHGs would be released. Its FEIS provided
annual data for 2007 on GHG emissions at mines in the South Gillette
area, and then projected how coal mining operations at the two leased
tracts would impact anticipated annual GHG emissions.253 BLM’s analysis
predicted that emissions from coal mining in the South Gillette area, taking
the four proposed leases into consideration, would together represent 1.7
245 Id. (citing Joint Appendix at 1281, WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-5300, 12-5312)).
246 Id. at 309.
247 WildEarth Guardians, 738 F.3d at 311–12.
248 Id. (quoting Duncan’s Point Lot Owner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 522
F.3d 371, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
249 WildEarth Guardians v. BLM, 8 F. Supp. 3d 17 (D.D.C. 2014).
250 Id. at 17.
251 Id. at 34–35.
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percent of the state of Wyoming’s projected 2020 CO2 emissions.254 BLM
also estimated the CO2 emissions from South Gillette area coal mining
and pending leases from other PRB mines.255 The EIS estimated that CO2
emissions resulting from coal combustion from all PRB mines for the
year 2006 represented 33.6 percent of the total CO2 emissions resulting
from coal combustion nationwide.256 BLM also included studies looking
at how the western U.S. could possibly be impacted by global warming and
climate change, but stated, “there are uncertainties regarding how climate
change may affect different regions.”257
Because the nature of climate science makes it difficult to estab-
lish specific connections between certain GHG emissions and correspond-
ing climate impacts, the court found that it was permissible for BLM to
consider GHG emissions as a proportion of statewide and nationwide
emissions.258 The court cited to draft CEQ guidance referenced in West
Antelope II, which stated that NEPA analyses did not need to attempt to
connect specific climate changes or impacts to the emissions of specific
projects, but rather, the emissions estimations “can serve as a reasonable
proxy for assessing potential climate change impacts.”259 For these reasons,
the court concluded that the FEIS adequately discussed climate impacts.260
In 2014, High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service
was decided by the United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado.261 The case involved environmental organizations seeking review
of three agency decisions that approved of mining exploration in roadless
sections of public lands that the Forest Service and BLM jointly man-
aged.262 The petitioners alleged that the decisions violated NEPA.263 The
court found that the Lease Modification FEIS insufficiently disclosed the
effects of GHG emissions; that the Colorado Roadless Rule (“CRR”) FEIS
did not disclose the GHG emissions associated with mining operations;
and that the CRR FEIS also inadequately disclosed the GHG emissions
resulting from combusting coal that would be mined.264 The court granted
254 Id. at 35.
255 WildEarth Guardians, 8 F. Supp. 3d at 35.
256 Id.
257 Id.
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259 Id. at 36.
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261 High Country Conservation Advocates v. U.S. Forest Service, 52 F. Supp. 3d 1174 (D.
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an injunction, and the government’s Exploration Plan was vacated.265
The court deemed the agencies’ evaluation of costs related to the mine’s
GHG emissions to be arbitrary and capricious.266
An EIS must disclose and evaluate all of the effects of a proposed
action—“whether direct, indirect, or cumulative”—to include “ecologi-
cal[,] . . . economic, [and] social” impacts of a proposed action.267 While the
agencies discussed the possibility of methane and carbon dioxide emissions,
the court held the agencies needed to discuss the effects of these emis-
sions.268 Rather, the agencies categorically denied that such an analysis
would be feasible.269 Instead, the court noted, the agencies could have
used the social cost of carbon protocol tool.270 This protocol was detailed in
a Technical Support Document put out by the IWG on Social Cost of Car-
bon, and is designed to calculate a project’s impact on costs related to global
climate change.271 The court therefore concluded that the FEIS failed to
use this tool based on “factually inaccurate justification[s].”272
The court found that, while NEPA does not mandate that agencies
conduct a cost-benefit analysis, the decision to quantify the positive
aspects of the leases and deny that an analogous inquiry into costs was
possible, despite the fact that such an analysis was possible (and had
been included in a prior draft EIS), was arbitrary and capricious.273 As-
sessing the economic impacts of GHGs is difficult at best, but any “hard
look” must incorporate a “hard look” at whether such analysis, however
indefinite, would provide for a more informed means of estimating these
impacts than simply ignoring them.274
The plaintiffs challenged the CRR FEIS’s failure to include any
estimate of how coal combustion would impact GHG emissions.275 The court
agreed that the agencies could not claim that it was overly speculative to
predict data for coal combustion emissions,276 especially when the agencies
had predicted emissions from prospective mining and coal combustion in
265 Id. at 1201.
266 Id. at 1190.
267 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b).
268 High Country, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 1190.
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other instances.277 Within the same FEIS, the court concluded, the agency
could not claim “it would be too speculative to estimate emissions from
‘coal that may or may not be produced’ from ‘mines that may or may not
be developed’ ” while at the same time disclosing detailed data on the
amount of coal those mines would produce.278
The court found that the agencies’ argument that new technology
could lower carbon emissions originating from future coal combustion
failed to qualify as a “hard look.”279 Agencies cannot speculate that future
technologies could possibly be invented to mitigate these effects.280
The agencies’ last argument was that the overall GHG emissions
from combustion would be the same regardless of these new operations
because if these operations did not occur there, consumer demand would
drive the coal to be mined elsewhere because coal is “a global
commodity.”281 Thus, if the coal does not originate from the North Fork
Valley of Colorado, the overall GHG emissions that can be attributed to
combustion would still be the same.282
However, the court rejected this argument.283 The court found that
producing coal in the North Fork would boost the amount of inexpensive
low-sulfur coal available, thus impacting the demand for coal as com-
pared to alternate fuel sources.284 Thus, coal that otherwise never would
have been mined would be burned.285 The agencies were therefore re-
quired to analyze this effect because it was reasonably foreseeable, “even
if the precise extent of the effect [was] less certain.”286
In 2017, the D.C. Circuit decided Sierra Club v. FERC.287 The case
involved environmental groups and landowners challenging the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) issuance of a certificate of
public convenience and necessity permitting three interstate natural gas
pipelines to be built in the southeastern U.S.288 The petitioners argued
the environmental assessment was inadequate.289 The court agreed that
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the EIS did not sufficiently discuss emissions resulting from burning the
gas transported by the pipelines.290 The court granted Sierra Club’s peti-
tion for review and remanded to bring the EIS into conformity, while
finding that the FERC acted properly in all other respects.291
Landowners challenged the pipelines because of the associated
seizure of their property, while environmental groups feared that burning
the natural gas would accelerate climate change.292 Communities objected
to the pipelines too, claiming “that pipeline facilities [would] be built in
low-income and predominantly minority areas.”293 Section 7 of the Natural
Gas Act gives FERC jurisdiction to approve or deny the construction of
interstate natural gas pipelines.294 FERC conducted an analysis of environ-
mental impacts related to the proposed project, released a draft of the
analysis in September 2015, and released the final version in December
of the same year.295 It issued Section 7 certificates and approved construc-
tion of the proposed project, so long as the construction complied with
certain conditions.296 The pipeline construction followed in August 2016.297
The environmental groups and the landowners petitioned for review of
the Certificate Order and the Rehearing Order.298 The Sierra Club argued
the EIS did not properly assess the project’s GHG emissions contribution.299
The court found that the Sierra Club members had standing to object to
the certification because they alleged concrete injuries and because the
certification was based on an insufficient EIS.300 An EIS can be deficient
even if it is not “directly tied to the members’ specific injuries.”301
The EIS serves dual purposes;302 first, it requires the agency to
scrutinize the environmental impacts of its decisions and to consider
alternatives to its proposed actions.303 Second, the EIS ensures the public
is informed of the potential consequences by requiring disclosure.304
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“NEPA directs agencies to only look hard at the environmental effects of
their decisions, and not to take one type of action.”305 The main issue,
then, was whether an EIS would undermine the public comment and make
the decision-making process less informed because of the EIS’s shortcom-
ings.306 The court also discussed the environmental justice issues, which
were not germane to the climate change issue, and concluded there were
no NEPA violations.307
The court then addressed whether an EIS should include a discus-
sion of the pipelines’ “downstream” effects and their cargo, and if so, to
what extent.308 It concluded that FERC was at least required to calculate
estimates of the power plant carbon emissions the pipeline would facili-
tate.309 A NEPA review must consider the direct effects and the indirect
environmental effects of a project.310 The phrase “reasonably foreseeable”
is the key, which describes effects “sufficiently likely to occur that a person
of ordinary prudence would take [them] into account in reaching a deci-
sion.”311 The court recognized the amount of gas burned in the power
plants was not only reasonably foreseeable, but was, in fact, “the project’s
entire purpose.”312 The court reasoned that it was likewise foreseeable
that burning natural gas would also emit carbon compounds that add to
climate change.313
The court distinguished Dep’t of Transportation v. Public Citizen,
in which the Supreme Court held that an agency does not have to ana-
lyze environmental effects when it has no legal power to prevent those
effects because it does not require a decision whether to inform the
public.314 The court applied this rationale to cases concerning liquefied
natural gas (“LNG”) licenses.315 One common issue among these cases was
whether FERC needed to analyze the effects on climate change of exporting
natural gas when it licensed physical upgrades for LNG terminals.316 The
court concluded that because “FERC had no legal authority to consider
305 Id. at 1367.
306 Id. at 1368.
307 Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1368, 1371–72.
308 Id. at 1371.
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the environmental effects of those exports,” no NEPA obligations to ana-
lyze those effects arose.317 “An agency has no obligation to gather or con-
sider environmental information if it has no statutory authority to act on
that information.”318
Congress made a broad delegation to FERC to evaluate applica-
tions for interstate pipelines considering public convenience and neces-
sity factors.319 Because the agency may deny applications based on their
environmental effects, the agency would thus become a legally relevant
cause of the environmental harms arising from the pipelines it approved.320
In this case, the court reasoned that FERC calculated the amount of gas
flowing through the pipelines, so they were capable of using that number
to predict GHG emissions from the power plants.321
The court concluded that the EIS “should have either given a
quantitative estimate of the downstream greenhouse emissions that will
result from burning the natural gas that the pipelines will transport or
explained more specifically why it could not have done so.”322 The court
reasoned GHG emissions were indirect byproducts of the project, and the
agency had the authority to permit the project, which meant it also had
the legal authority to mitigate impacts of that project.323 The EIS had to
discuss the aggregate incremental effect of the agency action in conjunction
with past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, in addition
to the impact of indirect effects.324 FERC should have “compared the
emissions from this project to emissions from other projects, to total emis-
sions from the state or the region, or to regional or national emissions-
control goals.”325 The court questioned how FERC, in the absence of such
comparisons, could have conducted adequately informed decision-making
or public comment on the GHG impacts of the project.326
While the court did not require FERC to put a number to GHG
emissions when there are indirect effects, it suggested that the agency’s
failure to provide even an explanation for its lack of a calculation was
unsatisfactory.327 In the court’s view, the fact that emissions estimates
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could have been based on assumptions did not preclude their inclusion
in the EIS because those assumptions could have been disclosed to the
public.328 Moreover, FERC is not excused “from making emissions estimates
because the [project’s] emissions might be partially offset by reductions
elsewhere.”329 The EIS must include beneficial and detrimental effects.330
Even if a project is subject to state or federal air permitting processes,
“the existence of permit requirements overseen by another federal agency
or state permitting authority cannot substitute for a proper NEPA analy-
sis.”331 In addition, the court held that FERC should explain in the EIS
whether the Social Cost of Carbon tool should be utilized.332 The court
then vacated and remanded the case to FERC for it to prepare an EIS
consistent with the opinion.333
Circuit Judge Brown concurred in part and dissented in part.334
He dissented from the opinion to vacate and remand on the issue of down-
stream greenhouse emissions.335 His position was that an agency does not
need to discuss in its EIS indirect environmental effects that occur as a
result of a separate agency issuing a license.336 FERC therefore has latitude
to determine whether it should analyze environmental effects based on
whether its decision-maker will be better informed from the inclusion of
that analysis.337 Here, Judge Brown pointed out that FERC acted within
its discretion in deciding not to analyze the downstream effects of the
proposed pipelines because the analysis of those effects would not add to
the decision-making process even if a causal link could be established.338
The causal relationship required by the statute is a “close” one
that is “akin to proximate cause in tort law.”339 Here, the Commission’s
action was not significant enough to establish its causal relationship to
the environmental effects in question because the agency was “powerless
to prevent” those effects; those effects therefore are not required under
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NEPA analysis.340 Here, FERC was not responsible for whether the
power plants causing those GHGs were ever created or built.341
Judge Brown cited multiple precedents where downstream envi-
ronmental effects could not be attributed to a commission because those
effects only came into existence because another agency issued a license,
giving that agency oversight of the associated environmental effects.342
Power plants, and their associated emissions, he noted, only come into
existence in Florida with the approval of the Board.343 Therefore, “NEPA
does not require FERC to address indirect environmental effects result-
ing from the Board’s licensing decision.”344 The Commission, therefore,
did not have this authorization and so was not responsible for analyzing
the emissions effects that authority would create, including downstream
GHG emissions.345 “Accordingly, the Commission was not obligated under
NEPA to discuss downstream greenhouse gas emissions.”346
On June 14, 2018, in San Juan Citizens Alliance v. BLM, the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico decided a challenge to oil
and gas leases issued in 2015 for thirteen parcels of federal land totaling
19,788 acres in New Mexico based on alleged violations of NEPA.347 The
court granted the plaintiffs part, and denied part, of the relief they re-
quested.348 The case involved an EIS issued by the Forest Service in 2008
that was supplemented in 2012 and reviewed in 2013 when the Forest
Service found it was adequate under NEPA.349 BLM then issued a Deci-
sion Record and EA in 2015 that tiered to and incorporated the Forest
Service’s earlier evaluations.350 After BLM issued the leases, plaintiffs
challenged the action claiming a variety of NEPA violations.351
Plaintiffs have a difficult challenge to overcome in NEPA-based
cases. If the adverse environmental effects of a proposed action are ade-
quately identified and evaluated, the agency may decide other values
outweigh the environmental costs of the project. Here, plaintiffs claimed
340 Id.
341 Id. at 1381.
342 Id.
343 Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1381.
344 Id. at 1382.
345 Id. at 1383.
346 Id.
347 San Juan Citizens Alliance v. BLM, 2018 WL 2994406 (D.N.M. 2018).
348 Id. at 2.
349 See generally id.
350 Id.
351 See generally San Juan Citizens Alliance, 2018 WL 2994406.
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the agencies did not satisfy the hard look standard by failing to consider
“direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts of the oil and gas leasing.”352 They
argued that BLM failed to consider: “(1) greenhouse gas emissions and
climate change; (2) air quality, (3) water resources—including the im-
pacts to water quantity, groundwater quality, and surface water quality;
and (4) the cumulative impacts of lease development.”353
BLM’s Decision Record concerning GHGs stated that it only con-
sidered GHG “emissions associated with exploration and production of
oil and gas.”354 It did not evaluate emissions from oil and gas consump-
tion.355 BLM’s position was that GHG emissions from consumption of oil
and gas do not constitute a direct effect that must be assessed under
NEPA.356 Although BLM did not analyze consumption emissions as a
direct effect, it did evaluate it as a cumulative effect.357 In its analysis,
BLM estimated the total potential emissions from field production at the
point when 118 wells were estimated to have produced 11,611 metric
tons of oil and gas per year (0.0018 percent of U.S. GHG emissions when
the leases were fully developed).358 BLM’s Decision Record stated its find-
ing that the cumulative effects of the lease sales on climate change would
be minimal—the alternative actions would lead to the same climate
change effects as taking no action.359 BLM also included in this assess-
ment effects of oil and gas development found in other reports.360 How-
ever, BLM could not “associate an action’s contribution in a localized area
to impacts on global climate change.”361 Lastly, BLM tiered its Decision
Record to the Forest Service’s earlier impacts statement which had estima-
tions of the oil and gas emissions correlated with the new leases.”362 BLM
stated that consumption is not an “indirect effect of oil and gas produc-
tion because production is not a proximate cause of GHG emissions
resulting from consumption.”363 The court criticized the statement as
“contrary to the reasoning in several persuasive cases,” which held an
352 Id. at 8.
353 Id. at 7.
354 Id. at 8.
355 Id.
356 San Juan Citizens Alliance, 2018 WL 2994406 at 8.
357 Id.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 8.
361 Id.
362 San Juan Citizens Alliance, 2018 WL 2994406 at 9.
363 Id.
212 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 43:173
agency’s decision allowing natural resource extraction indirectly caused
combustion emissions.364 In those cases, the court held that either the
EIS had to quantify downstream GHGs from burning natural gas or
explain why the agency could not have made such a calculation.365 “For
actions such as a Federal lease sale of coal for energy production, the
impacts associated with the end-use of the fossil fuel being extracted
would be . . . reasonably foreseeable.”366 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) states that
indirect effects of an action are effects that “are caused by the action and
are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably
foreseeable.”367 For these reasons, the court held it erroneous that BLM
failed to assess impacts of downstream oil, gas, and coal combustion that
would develop under the proposed projects.368 The court concluded that
BLM’s failure to estimate the amount of greenhouse gas emissions from
combustion of the oil and gas produced from these leases was arbi-
trary.369 Therefore, it ordered that BLM must reanalyze the potential im-
pact of such GHGs on climate change.370 The failure of BLM to quantify
and analyze the impacts of the downstream GHG emissions resulted in
the case being remanded.371 The court also held that BLM failed to conduct
a cumulative effects analysis as required by 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.372 While
the impact of the leasing may be insignificant when taken alone, “the
broader, significant ‘cumulative impact’ which must be considered by an
agency,” may be significant.373 BLM’s unjustified conclusion that this pro-
posed action would not lead to greater or different climate impacts than
taking no action, and that the impact was therefore minimal, failed to
satisfy the regulation’s requirements.374 Thus, the court required BLM
to revise its cumulative impacts analysis.
On June 19, 2018, Western Organization of Resource Councils v.
Zinke was decided by the D.C. Circuit.375 Plaintiffs in this case sought to
364 Id. at 10.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b).
368 San Juan Citizens Alliance, 2018 WL 2994406 at 29.
369 Id. at 11.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Id. at 14.
373 Id. (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., 538 F. 3d
1172, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008)).
374 San Juan Citizens Alliance, 2018 WL 2994406 at 14.
375 Western Org. of Res. Councils v. Zinke, 2018 WL 3028837 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2018).
2018] DEALING WITH CLIMATE CHANGE 213
compel the Secretary of the Interior to update the Federal Coal Manage-
ment Program’s PEIS.376 The appellants wanted the Secretary to update
the PEIS because it had been produced prior to a substantial change in
the understanding of the environmental impacts of coal leasing.377 The
court held that there was no binding duty created by the PEIS that re-
quired the Secretary to update it.378 The PEIS had been published in
1979 and was supplemented in 1985 with a finding that continued coal
leasing would have no long-term impacts on air quality.379 However, no
new action respecting the program was planned.380 The appellants claimed
that “tens of thousands of peer-reviewed scientific studies have identified
the causes and consequences of continued atmospheric warming and
showed that coal combustion is the single greatest contributor to the grow-
ing concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.”381 However,
the court held that neither NEPA nor the APA require the PEIS to be
updated.382 In administering the Coal Program, each lease the agency
issued would constitute a new “federal action,”383 and the DOI accordingly
prepared separate EISs or EAs prior to issuing each new proposed lease.384
However, even though the discrete EISs analyzed emissions related to
the lease, they failed to cover the impacts on the global climate by the
plan as a whole.385 DOI admitted the PEIS was outdated and relevant
new information on climate impacts existed, but it claimed there was no
NEPA obligation because no action based on the 1979 PEIS was being
considered.386 The court held that the “appellants have failed to identify
any specific pending action, apart from the Program’s continued exis-
tence, that qualifies as a ‘major Federal action’ under NEPA.”387 The court
considered the action completed in 1979, at the time the department pub-
lished the ROD and adopted the rule. That action was completed when
the DOI “issued the ROD and promulgated the final rule in 1979.”388
376 Id. at 1242.
377 Id. at 1245–46.
378 Id. at 1237.
379 Id. at 1239.
380 Id. at 1238.
381 Western Organization of Resource Councils, 2018 WL 3028837 at 1237.
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Because no “major Federal action” remains concerning the Federal Coal
Management Program, the court held that NEPA did not impose a duty
to supplement the PEIS.389
VII. DISCUSSION
NEPA was enacted to develop better information for federal agency
decision-makers that will lead to better decisions by considering the
environmental impact of their actions.390 The cases discussed above show
the agencies frequently fail to accomplish this goal. The ten cases dis-
cussed resulted in the federal government losing six cases, and one was
dismissed for lack of standing.391 The agencies appear to resist full NEPA
compliance because of the substantial cost in time and money. If NEPA
compliance requires an analysis of climate change impacts, especially if
the analysis includes dealing with indirect effects as well as cumulative
impacts, costs of compliance could increase substantially.392 Whether the
increased costs and other challenges of NEPA compliance would produce
information that results in better decisions is an issue to be considered.
However, such concerns may not be relevant. Elections have consequences.
The ideal agency executive should welcome additional informa-
tion. Because NEPA is primarily a procedural statute its effectiveness
depends on the integrity of the decision-maker. The statute’s viability
depends on federal agencies wanting to know how their actions will affect
climate change and how climate change will affect the federal agency. That
information needs to be integrated with the process for carrying out the
agency’s primary mission. However, NEPA cannot protect the environ-
ment if the president and the heads of the federal agencies dealing with
the environment and natural resources are committed to expanding fossil
fuel production without concern for the related climate change impacts.
President Trump’s efforts to expand the use of fossil fuels began with his
choices for Secretaries of the Interior, Energy, and State, as well as the
Administrator and Acting Administrator of EPA. Each have a record of
strong support for the fossil fuel industry, as well as a record of antipa-
thy toward environmental protection. The Trump administration’s imple-
mentation of the air pollution program (including climate change efforts)
389 Id.
390 McAliley, supra note 63, at 10197.
391 Supra Part VI.
392 McAliley, supra note 63, at 10200.
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demonstrates a continuing effort to reduce federal air environmental pro-
tection efforts.393 The Republican-controlled 115th Congress has supported
the president’s deregulation efforts, which results in both the CAA’s public
health protection mandate and its ecosystem protection mandate being
subordinated to a policy intended to minimize the cost to industry of en-
vironmental regulation.394
The president’s attitude concerning the CEQ was displayed on
December 21, 2017, when he nominated Kathleen Hartnett White to serve
as the chair of the CEQ.395 She had been the former commissioner of the
Texas Council on Environmental Quality, but her nomination was con-
troversial because of her views questioning whether climate change is re-
lated to the emissions from the use of fossil fuels.396 Her nomination was
blocked by the Senate, but on January 8, 2018, President Trump once again
nominated her.397 His initial choice for his chief advisor on environmental
matters was a person who does not believe in the consensus position of
scientists concerning both conventional air pollution and climate change.
As the controversy over her nomination continued, the president with-
drew Ms. White’s nomination in February 2018, and in June 2018, the
president nominated Mary Neumayr, a former House Energy and Com-
merce Committee energy counsel.398 While counsel for the Committee,
393 Since becoming the EPA’s Administrator Scott Pruitt has worked to undermine more than
thirty rules including at least ten air pollution rules. He has also worked to downsize the
Agency’s workforce and budget, weaken EPA’s science capabilities, and scale back oversight
of state programs. Umair Irfan, Scott Pruitt is slowly strangling the EPA, VOX (last updated
Mar. 8, 2018 8:19 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/1/29/16684
952/epa-scott-pruitt-director-regulations [https://perma.cc/R6UC-GM4Y].
394 Chris D’Angelo, Republicans Look To Block EPA From Tackling Climate Change, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/gary-palmer-bill-epa
_us_58949441e4b0406131365066 [https://perma.cc/HWD2-XP35].
395 Brian Dennis & Chris Mooney, Trump taps Climate Skeptic for top White House envi-
ronmental post, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/energy-environment/wp/2017/10/13/trump-taps-climate-skeptic-for-top-white-house-envi
ronmental-post/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a05e7ab21ac6 [https://perma.cc/DX7A-P4C7].
396 Tiffany Stecker, Energy, Environment Nominees Hit Snag in Senate’s Year-End Wrapup,
BLOOMBERG ENERGY AND CLIMATE REP. (Dec. 22, 2017), https://bnanews.bna.com/environ
ment-and-energy/energy-environment-nominees-hit-snag-in-senates-year-end-wrapup
[https://perma.cc/V8JW-637N].
397 Rob Tricchinelli & Dean Scott, Trump Renominates Candidates for Environmental,
Safety Posts, BLOOMBERG ENERGY AND CLIMATE REPORT (Jan. 8, 2018), https://news.bloom
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ronmental-safety-posts?context=article-related [https://perma.cc/UGZ6-W2D4].
398 Ari Natter, Trump to Nominate Former House Staffer for Top Environment Job, BLOOM-
BERG DAILY ENV’T REP. (June 14, 2018), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environ
ment-and-energy/trump-to-nominate-former-house-staffer-for-top-environment-job/ [https://
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she had worked on the 2011 legislation to exclude GHGs from regulation
under the CAA.399 She is expected to be confirmed, but as of August 2018
this has not occurred.400 It is expected that the CEQ will continue working
to revise NEPA’s implementing regulations.401 While nearly all knowledge-
able people believe climate change is an existential threat, the President
and nearly all of his political appointees do not.
The federal government continues to work to prevent the use and
dissemination of information that could support efforts to limit and adapt
to climate change. On April 28, 2017, EPA removed from its website over
200 pages of information on climate change titled “Climate and Energy
Resources for State, Local and Tribal Governments.”402 Three months later,
a new website focused on energy was added.403 Documents obtained by
the Environmental Defense Fund’s Freedom of Information Act request
show that former Administrator Pruitt and his political appointees were
personally involved in removing material related to climate change.404
On October 31, 2017, former Administrator Pruitt issued a directive
“Strengthening and Improving Membership on EPA Federal Advisory Com-
mittees.”405 The directive bars membership on EPA advisory committees for
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versial nominee to head Council on Environmental Quality, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 4,
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anyone currently receiving an EPA grant.406 It applies primarily to academ-
ics, but does not apply to state, tribal, or local government agencies.407 On
November 3, 2017, EPA released a list of new appointees that primarily
includes state and industry employees.408 The Union of Concerned Scien-
tists has documented the Trump administration’s attack on science in
more detail.409 In President Trump’s 2019 budget proposal, released
February 12, 2018, he proposed to eliminate or seriously reduce funding
for numerous scientific and diplomatic efforts by EPA to study or address
climate change.410
CONCLUSION
NEPA was enacted in 1970, about twenty years prior to the time
that GHG emissions and climate change began to be a concern of the en-
vironmental community.411 The regulations and court cases that shaped
the development of environmental laws, including NEPA, were concerned
with conventional pollutants and traditional natural resources issues. As
GHG emissions and climate change issues developed, they became part
of the NEPA review process.412 Under NEPA, the legal issues that became
most important were the need to consider alternatives and the extent to
which cumulative effects needed to be addressed for specific projects.413
This resulted in inconsistent agency reviews of climate change effects
because the coverage required was largely left to agency discretion.414
Judicial review of NEPA-based analyses of climate change issues
rarely occurs. The costs of litigation and the fact that NEPA only requires
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procedural compliance discourages challenges. Moreover, courts are usually
deferential to agency judgment calls. Nevertheless, NEPA has served a
useful function in broadening agency perspectives. Its success over the
years was aided by a bipartisan concern that federal agency decisions
should take environmental values into consideration. That changed in
recent years, as the nation’s political parties moved to more extreme
positions. Environmental laws have often been the scapegoat for prob-
lems generated by globalization and population growth. At the same
time, the massive influx of money into the political process has isolated
both political parties from the need to be concerned for their constituents.
The ability of corporations and billionaires to control the political process
has led to facts being unimportant, and truth is whatever the interest
group with the most money wants it to be. Environmental protection has
become a casualty. For NEPA to be effective, it requires good faith leader-
ship of the federal agencies by those with both competence and a desire
to achieve their agency’s mission while balancing broader considerations
including environmental protection. Unfortunately, the agencies charged
with environmental, energy, and natural resource protection are headed
by executives with an agenda at variance with the goals of NEPA. Until
that changes, the weaknesses of the NEPA process will make it a tool of
limited value in adapting to climate change.
